July 2000
The RUF Confronts UN Peacekeepers
Posted Friday, July 21, 2000 by sjk
By Peter A. Dumbuya
On May 1, 2000, ex-combatants of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Makeni, the provincial capital of the Northern Province, began a systematic campaign to kidnap, harass, and terrorize peacekeepers and military observers of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).
The attacks spread to Magburaka, Koidu, Kailahun and other towns and cities throughout Sierra Leone. By May 15, the RUF had seized over 352 (out of 9,495) UNAMSIL personnel and held them hostage. The Security Council established UNAMSIL on October 22, 1999 to assist in the implementation of the 1999 Lome Peace Agreement to which the government and the RUF were signatories. To many observers and critics alike, the RUF’s blatant disregard of the Lome Peace Agreement, and the taking of hostages was the latest in a series of humiliating setbacks for UN peacekeeping operations around the world.
That the RUF decided to embarrass the UN did not come as a surprise to most Sierra Leoneans. The RUF timed the attacks against UNAMSIL personnel to coincide with the departure of the last contingent of ECOMOG troops from Sierra Leone on May 2. Throughout the nine-year-old armed conflict, the RUF had opposed the presence of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone. The RUF viewed ECOMOG not as a neutral force, but as an ally of the government and an obstacle to the achievement of its war objective: seizing the reins of power in Freetown. By the same token, Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, had misgivings about UNAMSIL peacekeepers and accused them of unilaterally disarming his combatants.
To appreciate the latest setback for UN peacekeeping efforts, we need to examine the internal and external factors that precipitated the RUF attacks against UNAMSIL personnel in Makeni.
Internal Factors
Since March 15, Sankoh had made known to Parliament and the general public his dissatisfaction with the peace process. In particular, he complained of the slow pace of disarmament, the inadequacy of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs and facilities, and the lack of incentives for RUF ex-combatants. Despite the fact that four RUF ministers and four deputy ministers had been incorporated into the government, Sankoh continued to lament the absence of RUF members in state-controlled enterprises, and the lack of progress in the implementation of the other political provisions of the Lome Peace Agreement.
Further, until his disappearance (following the massacre of 24 demonstrators by his bodyguards in front of his residence on May 8) and capture on May 17, Sankoh himself had served as chairman of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD). In that position, which carried the status of vice president, Sankoh reported directly to President Ahmad T. Kabbah.
In his report to the Security Council (May 19, 2000), Secretary General Kofi Annan also pointed to the slow pace of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants as a factor in the current crisis. He underscored the political and administrative problems the government continued to grapple with in the days leading up to May 1 when the RUF began to seize UNAMSIL peacekeepers. Despite these and other factors, General Annan concluded that the RUF continued to hinder UNAMSIL deployment especially in the Kono district, the center of the RUF’s illegal diamond mining operations. It should be noted that the number of RUF ex-combatants who had reported for disarmament in the Kono district very remained compared to other districts.
External Factors
Observers have described the RUF’s decision to seize UNAMSIL peacekeepers as a test of the UN’s resolve. In recent years, the UN has faced numerous challenges in its peacekeeping missions around the world. The leadership of the RUF was keenly aware of the challenges and criticisms leveled against the UN for its failures in places like Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. By timing its attacks against UNAMSIL peacekeepers with the departure of ECOMOG troops, the leaders of the RUF intended not only to undermine the peace process, but also to defeat the rump of government forces and eventually seize power from the presently constituted government of President Kabbah.
By failing to achieve this goal, the RUF now faces the possibility of losing the political gains it had made under the Lome Peace Agreement.
As has been alluded to above, UN peacekeeping missions faced serious challenges in the 1990s. In Somalia (1992-1993), UN peacekeepers not only failed to keep supply lines open to starving Somalis and protect them from rapacious warlords, but also suffered heavy casualties at the hands of disparate groups of fighters and common thugs. The United States intervened in December 1992 and managed to open supply lines and feed the people. Within months, however, its troops became embroiled in pitched battles with gangs of armed fighters in the streets of Mogadishu. The downing of United States helicopters and the parade of dead soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu forced the Clinton administration to withdraw its troops from Somalia.
In Rwanda (April-July 1994), 2500 UN peacekeepers were overwhelmed by Hutu extremists/Interahamwe militias who massacred over 800,000 Tutsi (the minority population) and their Hutu allies, 14 UN peacekeepers, and local UN staffers. The report (December 15, 1999) of an independent inquiry concluded that: “The fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to the United Nations presence there. There was a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness.”
Similar setbacks dogged the footsteps of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR; established in February 1992) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (where war began on April 6, 1992). Following NATO air strikes around Sarajevo in May 1995, Serb forces seized over 400 UN personnel some of whom were tied to utility poles and bridges as human shields to deter further air attacks. The Report of the Secretary General on the Fall of Srebrenica (November 15, 1999) estimated that Serb forces killed 20,000 people, mainly Bosnian Muslims, in UN safe havens like Srebrenica which fell to Serb forces on July 6-11 July 1995. In addition, 117 members of UNPROFOR lost their lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina
These chilling statistics and the tough challenges that faced UN peacekeeping missions in these and other flash points may have goaded the RUF into taking UNAMSIL hostages in May of this year. As the inquiry into the Rwandan genocide noted, “the deaths of the Pakistani and US peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993 had a deep effect on the attitude towards the conduct of peacekeeping operations.” The UN became wary of “undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states.” Be that as it may, the international outcry against the atrocities committed by the RUF in the Sierra Leone conflict would ensure continued UN peacekeeping operations, albeit limited in nature, in the world’s trouble spots.
The War on All Fronts
Posted Sunday, July 2, 2000 by sjk
By Peter A. Dumbuya
With the overthrow of the APC party and regime in April 1992, many Sierra Leoneans looked forward to a negotiated settlement that would end the one-year old civil war. Instead of peace, however, the civil war ground on as the NPRC military junta tried to shore up its position in Freetown. Admirers of Captain Valentine Strasser, the twenty-something-year old leader of the NPRC military junta, referred to him as the “redeemer.” The RUF resented the fact that the military junta had just snatched up a rare opportunity to oust President Joseph S. Momoh and the decrepit APC party and regime.
In the months and years that followed, both the NPRC and RUF fought both for control of the hearts and minds of the people as well as for every inch of Sierra Leonean territory. For instance, the RUF depicted the NPRC as an illegitimate and corrupt military junta from whose control it sought to “liberate” the people. On the other hand, the NPRC characterized the RUF as little more than a terrorist organization devoid of any political ideology or program of transition to democratic rule.
Buoyed by its murky claim to being a movement dedicated to the eradication of corruption and black neocolonialism in Sierra Leone and Africa in general, the RUF viewed the youthful leaders of the NPRC military junta as “criminal adventurers.” With military backing from Nigeria and other West African states, the RUF believed that the NPRC was bent on establishing its own brand of dictatorship in the war torn state. To date, the RUF views the presence of Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone as the only barrier to its victory over government forces and their allies on the battle field. In the estimation of Foday Sankoh, the RUF was not different from the NPRC, because both of them were “rebel” outfits vying for control of State House in Freetown. Despite its detractors, the NPRC characterized itself as the de jure government with a mission to bring about democratic change in Sierra Leone.
By 1995 the RUF claimed to have “liberated” about 80 percent of Sierra Leone from government forces. Thus, the movement saw no need to negotiate with the NPRC to end the civil war. Although rebels advanced to within less than fifty miles of the capital city of Freetown by the end of 1995, the RUF never established any systematic administrative control over the provinces and districts. Instead, the rebels murdered and terrorized unarmed civilians, hacked off their limbs, used captured women and young girls as sex slaves, and in general created an atmosphere filled with fear and rendered vast areas of the state ungovernable.
As one would expect, the continuation of the civil war deepened the humanitarian crisis in which tens of thousands of people were displaced or forced to seek refuge in neighboring Liberia and Guinea. The deliberate targeting of unarmed and defenseless civilians and the wholesale evacuation of towns and villages created a fertile ground for marauding soldiers and rebels alike. Pillaging soldiers who also collaborated with the RUF rebels came to be known as sobels. With state institutions and authority in decline or non-existent over a wide swath of territory, soldiers, rebels, sobels, and freelance bandits mined and sold diamonds through illegal channels; they also did a brisk business in other goods and services. As Charles Taylor’s NPFL had done in neighboring Liberia, the RUF used the proceeds of the illegal trade in diamonds and other goods to purchase weapons, equipment, and supplies for its rebels.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that since the onset of the civil war in March 1991, the RUF has steadfastly refused to cede the diamond mining districts of Kono and Kenema to government forces or, in recent months, to United Nations peacekeepers. As numerous writers have observed, state control of the resource-rich districts has nurtured patron-client networks since the heady days of the APC party and regime. The impact of the “parallel economy” has been devastating on the nation as a whole. For example, the illegal extraction of resources has deprived the state of much needed revenues with which to pay for essential programs like education and health, prosecute the civil war, and pay salaries for teachers and civil servants. By 1993 coffee and cocoa production had declined by 50 percent, while revenues from the export of diamonds (and cash crops, gold, rutile, and bauxite) had dried up.
The collapse of state institutions and authority, coupled with the opportunity to plunder the state’s resources, encouraged the proliferation of “rebel” groups. As has been mentioned above, these groups comprised disaffected soldiers or sobels who resented the ostentatious life styles of the NPRC leaders, army deserters, displaced youth, RUF abductees, and gangs of looters and marauders united by a desire to terrorize unarmed civilians and unseat the NPRC military junta. In addition, these disparate “rebel” groups raided towns and villages, and looted property that they then sold on the parallel market within and outside Sierra Leone. They also disrupted all economic activities, including raids on diamond and other mining centers in order to deprive the government of much needed revenues.
With vast opportunities for the plunder and rape of the state’s resources, the RUF and its confederates saw no need to negotiate an end to the war with the NPRC and the successor government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. As the next few articles will point out, the RUF and its leader, Foday Sankoh, used every available opportunity to grab power in Sierra Leone.