Let' Talk Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone :The RUF and the Peace Process  by Peter Dumbuya

ve being the removal of the NRPC military junta from power. In July 1992, West Africa magazine quoted Sankoh as saying that: "I am fighting a survival war for my people. No surrender, no retreat."

This inflexible posture has dominated the negotiating position of the RUF since 1992 when the NPRC denied it the victory it sought over the outmoded APC party and regime. As the war progressed, the RUF began to insist upon the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the battlefield before peace talks could be held. The RUF solidified its opposition to the presence of foreign troops in Sierra Leone at the failed exploratory peace talks at the Mano River Bridge in December 1994. It is against this backdrop that one can begin to understand the decision by leaders of the RUF to seize United Nations peacekeepers in May of this year. The situation in Sierra Leone further called into question the commitment of the international community to UN peacekeeping operations in developing countries like Sierra Leone. For instance, at the height of the Rwandan genocide of April-July 1994, Rwandan soldiers and their collaborators seized and murdered UN peacekeepers in the war-ravaged central African state. The mandate of UN peacekeepers in zones of conflict still remains the subject of heated debate within and beyond great halls of the UN itself.

The Abidjan (1996) and Lome (1999) Peace Agreements established broad outlines within which peace, national reconciliation, and the reorganization of civil society could be achieved. Among other things, both peace agreements provided for the transformation of the RUF into a registered political party, the creation of a professional army, strengthening the independence of the Judiciary, and the resuscitation of the economy. Implementation of this agreement was dealt a fatal blow when the military seized power in a bloody coup d’etat and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in May 1997.

The extraordinarily brutal AFRC military junta of Major Johnny Paul Koroma failed to win recognition from the international community as well as the Sierra Leone public. Buffeted by an embargo, leaders of the embattled military junta signed the Conakry Peace Accord in October 1997. Among other things, the Accord mandated the restoration of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah within six months. Like the Abidjan Peace Agreement, the Conakry Accord fell victim to various obscure interpretations by leaders of the junta. With no progress in sight, ECOMOG forces prepared to enter Freetown by force of arms. On February 12, 1998, ECOMOG forces recaptured State House and the Parliament building from junta the forces and their RUF collaborators. Accompanied by other West African leaders, President Kabbah returned to Freetown on March 10.

Captured junta officers and civilians, including Sankoh who was flown in from Nigeria, were tried and convicted of treason in Freetown. On October 19, 1998, 24 army officers were executed for their role in the coup. Sankoh and other civilian defendants were waiting for their appeals against the death sentence to be heard when RUF rebels stormed Freetown in January 1999 and removed Kabbah from office. By February 24, however, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces had driven the rebels from Freetown and Waterloo. The rump of the RUF retreated into the provinces where they continued to commit unspeakable atrocities against defenseless civilians.

The ensuing Lome Peace Agreement, signed by Kabbah and Sankoh on July 7, 1999, was a carbon copy of the Abidjan Peace Agreement except in one important area: power sharing. Under Article V, the government offered the RUF the opportunity to join a broad-based government of national unity. Eventually Sankoh became chairman of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction, and Development (CMRRD), with the status of vice president. The autonomous CMRRD was charged with monitoring and providing security in areas where diamonds, gold, and other strategic resources were mined, issuing mining licenses, overseeing the sale and export of diamonds and gold, and managing the state’s rehabilitation and reconstruction programs. The enlarged Cabinet would consist of four RUF ministers, and four deputy ministers. The Lome Agreement showed that the composition of the government was just as important as how power was exercised.

With responsibility for peace implementation now shared by the democratically elected government and the RUF, it was hoped that the lingering conflict would soon come to an end. Since 1991, the RUF and its confederates had sold the country’s diamonds, gold, and other resources and then used the proceeds to purchase weapons, supplies, and food. By placing Sankoh at the helm of the CMRRD, the government sought to transform the RUF into respectable organization that would not only help in the reconstruction of the state and civil society, but also protect the country’s vital resources. The parallel with neighboring Liberia is inescapable. Like the voters who elected him president, Charles Taylor believed that he alone could rebuild what his rebel organization had destroyed during that country’s civil war. However, those who were wary of power sharing pointed to the RUF’s past dubious dealings with the government, and warned of the possibility of a power-grab by Sankoh and other rebel leaders. As the events of May 2000 have shown, Kabbah should have listened to the skeptics and critics of power sharing within the context of the Lome Peace Agreement.

Next issue: The RUF Confronts the UN Peacekeepers.

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