That the RUF decided to embarrass the UN did not come as a surprise to most Sierra Leoneans. The RUF timed the attacks against UNAMSIL personnel to coincide with the departure of the last contingent of ECOMOG troops from Sierra Leone on May 2. Throughout the nine-year-old armed conflict, the RUF had opposed the presence of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone. The RUF viewed ECOMOG not as a neutral force, but as an ally of the government and an obstacle to the achievement of its war objective: seizing the reins of power in Freetown. By the same token, Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, had misgivings about UNAMSIL peacekeepers and accused them of unilaterally disarming his combatants.

To appreciate the latest setback for UN peacekeeping efforts, we need to examine the internal and external factors that precipitated the RUF attacks against UNAMSIL personnel in Makeni.

Since March 15, Sankoh had made known to Parliament and the general public his dissatisfaction with the peace process. In particular, he complained of the slow pace of disarmament, the inadequacy of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs and facilities, and the lack of incentives for RUF ex-combatants. Despite the fact that four RUF ministers and four deputy ministers had been incorporated into the government, Sankoh continued to lament the absence of RUF members in state-controlled enterprises, and the lack of progress in the implementation of the other political provisions of the Lome Peace Agreement.

Further, until his disappearance (following the massacre of 24 demonstrators by his bodyguards in front of his residence on May 8) and capture on May 17, Sankoh himself had served as chairman of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD). In that position, which carried the status of vice president, Sankoh reported directly to President Ahmad T. Kabbah.

In his report to the Security Council (May 19, 2000), Secretary General Kofi Annan also pointed to the slow pace of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants as a factor in the current crisis. He underscored the political and administrative problems the government continued to grapple with in the days leading up to May 1 when the RUF began to seize UNAMSIL peacekeepers. Despite these and other factors, General Annan concluded that the RUF continued to hinder UNAMSIL deployment especially in the Kono district, the center of the RUF’s illegal diamond mining operations. It should be noted that the number of RUF ex-combatants who had reported for disarmament in the Kono district very remained compared to other districts.

Observers have described the RUF’s decision to seize UNAMSIL peacekeepers as a test of the UN’s resolve. In recent years, the UN has faced numerous challenges in its peacekeeping missions around the world. The leadership of the RUF was keenly aware of the challenges and criticisms leveled against the UN for its failures in places like Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. By timing its attacks against UNAMSIL peacekeepers with the departure of ECOMOG troops, the leaders of the RUF intended not only to undermine the peace process, but also to defeat the rump of government forces and eventually seize power from the presently constituted government of President Kabbah. By failing to achieve this goal, the RUF now faces the possibility of losing the political gains it had made under the Lome Peace Agreement.

As has been alluded to above, UN peacekeeping missions faced serious challenges in the 1990s. In Somalia (1992-1993), UN peacekeepers not only failed to keep supply lines open to starving Somalis and protect them from rapacious warlords, but also suffered heavy casualties at the hands of disparate groups of fighters and common thugs. The United States intervened in December 1992 and managed to open supply lines and feed the people. Within months, however, its troops became embroiled in pitched battles with gangs of armed fighters in the streets of Mogadishu. The downing of United States helicopters and the parade of dead soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu forced the Clinton administration to withdraw its troops from Somalia.

In Rwanda (April-July 1994), 2500 UN peacekeepers were overwhelmed by Hutu extremists/Interahamwe militias who massacred over 800,000 Tutsi (the minority population) and their Hutu allies, 14 UN peacekeepers, and local UN staffers. The report (December 15, 1999) of an independent inquiry concluded that: "The fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to the United Nations presence there. There was a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness."

Similar setbacks dogged the footsteps of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR; established in February 1992) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (where war began on April 6, 1992). Following NATO air strikes around Sarajevo in May 1995, Serb forces seized over 400 UN personnel some of whom were tied to utility poles and bridges as human shields to deter further air attacks. The Report of the Secretary General on the Fall of Srebrenica (November 15, 1999) estimated that Serb forces killed 20,000 people, mainly Bosnian Muslims, in UN safe havens like Srebrenica which fell to Serb forces on July 6-11 July 1995. In addition, 117 members of UNPROFOR lost their lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

These chilling statistics and the tough challenges that faced UN peacekeeping missions in these and other flash points may have goaded the RUF into taking UNAMSIL hostages in May of this year. As the inquiry into the Rwandan genocide noted, "the deaths of the Pakistani and US peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993 had a deep effect on the attitude towards the conduct of peacekeeping operations." The UN became wary of "undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states." Be that as it may, the international outcry against the atrocities committed by the RUF in the Sierra Leone conflict would ensure continued UN peacekeeping operations, albeit limited in nature, in the world’s trouble spots.