Let' Talk Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone :The War on All Fronts  by Peter Dumbuya

(Continued from : The RUF at War)

With the overthrow of the APC party and regime in April 1992, many Sierra Leoneans looked forward to a negotiated settlement that would end the one-year old civil war. Instead of peace, however, the civil war ground on as the NPRC military junta tried to shore up its position in Freetown. Admirers of Captain Valentine Strasser, the twenty-something-year old leader of the NPRC military junta, referred to him as the "redeemer." The RUF resented the fact that the military junta had just snatched up a rare opportunity to oust President Joseph S. Momoh and the decrepit APC party and regime.

In the months and years that followed, both the NPRC and RUF fought both for control of the hearts and minds of the people as well as for every inch of Sierra Leonean territory. For instance, the RUF depicted the NPRC as an illegitimate and corrupt military junta from whose control it sought to "liberate" the people. On the other hand, the NPRC characterized the RUF as little more than a terrorist organization devoid of any political ideology or program of transition to democratic rule.

Buoyed by its murky claim to being a movement dedicated to the eradication of corruption and black neocolonialism in Sierra Leone and Africa in general, the RUF viewed the youthful leaders of the NPRC military junta as "criminal adventurers." With military backing from Nigeria and other West African states, the RUF believed that the NPRC was bent on establishing its own brand of dictatorship in the war torn state. To date, the RUF views the presence of Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone as the only barrier to its victory over government forces and their allies on the battle field. In the estimation of Foday Sankoh, the RUF was not different from the NPRC, because both of them were "rebel" outfits vying for control of State House in Freetown. Despite its detractors, the NPRC characterized itself as the de jure government with a mission to bring about democratic change in Sierra Leone.

By 1995 the RUF claimed to have "liberated" about 80 percent of Sierra Leone from government forces. Thus, the movement saw no need to negotiate with the NPRC to end the civil war. Although rebels advanced to within less than fifty miles of the capital city of Freetown by the end of 1995, the RUF never established any systematic administrative control over the provinces and districts. Instead, the rebels murdered and terrorized unarmed civilians, hacked off their limbs, used captured women and young girls as sex slaves, and in general created an atmosphere filled with fear and rendered vast areas of the state ungovernable.

As one would expect, the continuation of the civil war deepened the humanitarian crisis in which tens of thousands of people were displaced or forced to seek refuge in neighboring Liberia and Guinea. The deliberate targeting of unarmed and defenseless civilians and the wholesale evacuation of towns and villages created a fertile ground for marauding soldiers and rebels alike. Pillaging soldiers who also collaborated with the RUF rebels came to be known as sobels. With state institutions and authority in decline or non-existent over a wide swath of territory, soldiers, rebels, sobels, and freelance bandits mined and sold diamonds through illegal channels; they also did a brisk business in other goods and services. As Charles Taylor’s NPFL had done in neighboring Liberia, the RUF used the proceeds of the illegal trade in diamonds and other goods to purchase weapons, equipment, and supplies for its rebels.

It comes as no surprise, therefore, that since the onset of the civil war in March 1991, the RUF has steadfastly refused to cede the diamond mining districts of Kono and Kenema to government forces or, in recent months, to United Nations peacekeepers. As numerous writers have observed, state control of the resource-rich districts has nurtured patron-client networks since the heady days of the APC party and regime. The impact of the "parallel economy" has been devastating on the nation as a whole. For example, the illegal extraction of resources has deprived the state of much needed revenues with which to pay for essential programs like education and health, prosecute the civil war, and pay salaries for teachers and civil servants. By 1993 coffee and cocoa production had declined by 50 percent, while revenues from the export of diamonds (and cash crops, gold, rutile, and bauxite) had dried up.

The collapse of state institutions and authority, coupled with the opportunity to plunder the state’s resources, encouraged the proliferation of "rebel" groups. As has been mentioned above, these groups comprised disaffected soldiers or sobels who resented the ostentatious life styles of the NPRC leaders, army deserters, displaced youth, RUF abductees, and gangs of looters and marauders united by a desire to terrorize unarmed civilians and unseat the NPRC military junta. In addition, these disparate "rebel" groups raided towns and villages, and looted property that they then sold on the parallel market within and outside Sierra Leone. They also disrupted all economic activities, including raids on diamond and other mining centers in order to deprive the government of much needed revenues.

With vast opportunities for the plunder and rape of the state’s resources, the RUF and its confederates saw no need to negotiate an end to the war with the NPRC and the successor government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. As the next few articles will point out, the RUF and its leader, Foday Sankoh, used every available opportunity to grab power in Sierra Leone.

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