THE DEBATE: With each passing day, Leonenetters continue to debate what would be the best approach to dislodging the RUF/JUNTA alliance and the ultimate release of a nation held hostage since May 25, 1997. Today, Mr. Vidal Smith visits the issues and challenges confronting the Peace-lovers and the Warmongers as we have come define the two camps.
Date: Friday, 12-Sep-97 07:44 PM
From: Vidal Smith (vsmith@internet.stem.com)
Subject: CONSITUATIONAL DYNAMICS OF WAR AND PEACE IN Sa. LEONE.
Contrary to my opinion, a good number of people in this forum believe that nothing else but a negotiated settlement should have been tried to bring the present crisis in our country to an end. The threat of force and embargo are not necessary, they claim. These advocates for "peace now" presume that the only pertinent parties in this scenario are the AFRC/RUF and the Kabba government. I prefer to say "Kabba government" rather than SLPP, because the cabinet included members of an opposing party. Just bring them together, forge a compromise and all hostilities will cease. That happened once before, my friends. Anyhow, I contend that lasting peace cannot be achieved, even if a brokered settlement is successfully concluded between the two parties.
In fact, I think that a negotiated settlement has failed to materialise so far ecause the AFRC/RUF is not a united front, in terms of motives and aspirations, but a loosely bound amalgam of convenience that has gone awry. JPK and his boys grossly miscalculated the merits and benefits of such a marriage, and blindly neglected to account for the downsides of inviting the RUF to their revolution. Granted that the AFRC/RUF collaboration had likely started out with "sobelization" during NPRC rule, the AFRC alone would have made a more credible usurper in the eyes and minds of the people, and a negotiated settlement to this crisis would have come much sooner. Ironically, the AFRC could have obtained concessions for the RUF from the Kabba government, under the guise of demands for changes to ensure lasting peace, while the RUF stayed clandestinely partnered with the AFRC. However, the RUF will not let the AFRC represent their interests. To do so will be putting their trust on elements of the Momoh regime, who were their arch enemies only five years back. It is this total lack of trust among these two, and several other pertinent factions that threatens to make lasting peace a fleeting phenomenon for Sierra Leone.
Apart from the AFRC, the RUF and the "Kabbatistas", there are now other takeholders, some more important than others, that do/could influence the dynamics of war and peace in the country. With no pretence at exhaustiveness, these include: the Karmajors, the non-AFRC soldiers, ECOMOG, Charles Taylor, and the regional groupings of the southerners, the northerners, the easterners, and the Freetonians. I realize that some of these sets I have chosen do overlap, but each one deserves treatment as an entity given its potential for situational importance. As we look at the makeup and the political affiliations of each faction; the effects of the protracted war on each; the actions, reactions or inaction of each; we start to build a picture as to what needs to be done or changed to effect a lasting peace.
CAUTION: Incidental to my approach of using broad groupings to facilitate my analysis, are the very real dangers of generalizations and stereotyping. Additionally, be warned that none of what I write was obtained empirically or in anyway researched. Rather, I am basing my analysis on vocalized perceptions from the many, many Sierra Leoneans I interact with. I am convinced such peoples’ opinions are representative of their broader group. I have deliberately accepted such perceptions as the realities that shape the politics and outlook of these factions. Please indulge me and correct me as you wish.
The AFRC: Largely made up of "Momohistas" and remnants of the APC. Perceived to be largely a grouping of northerners. Disgruntled, sore losers of the last elections. Well represented in the RSLMF, largely due to politically connected appointments during the long reign of the APC. They grudgingly served under the early NPRC, determined to eradicate the RUF menace. As the war progressed, the NPRC got increasingly popular for a while, and consolidation of power in the hands of non-Momohistas intensified, the incentive for sobelization got more attractive for the latter. Why help the success of those that toppled their master and benefactor. Eradication of Bambay by the NPRC catalyzed the sellout to the RUF.
Decided to give the elections a chance, because NPRC played the EO card and neutralized their effectiveness for destabilization from within the RSLMF. Really believed a reconstituted APC could win. Lost the elections, but stayed a cohesive force and never stopped planning for their return to power.
Failed attempt landed JPK et al in jail, but succeeded on May 25. Grossly underestimated the resolve of the people to resist a military takeover, and really blundered with the hasty invitation of the RUF. The AFRC is now like a wounded animal that would fight back ferociously, because it has been cornered by not only ECOMOG, but by the RUF. They want to compromise but not at the cost of the things RUF would like to keep, namely, power over all the people. The AFRC would like to be granted immunity from prosecution, and secured financial futures, and power-sharing.
The RUF: A revolutionary experiment gone bad. Rooted largely in the south and east of the country. Perceived to have arisen from the destabilized situation in the south, caused by intra-regional violence between supporters of Minah, on one hand, and his political foes on the other. Transmutations catalyzed by the volatile dynamics of the situations in Sierra Leone and Liberia, have left its leadership in the hands of the most violent faction of this group, whose will and capability to destroy lives and property have been grossly underestimated. Their goal is absolute power in Sierra Leone or nothing. They doggedly pursue a scorched-earth policy and now that they occupy the seat of national power don’t want to negotiate. They do not trust ECOWAS and the Kabbatistas, who they believe have reneged on the terms and conditions of the Abuja agreement. Boasts large numbers of loyal recruits and conscripts, ready to fight to the end.
The questions are: (1)Can they run a national government? (2) How long could they feel comfortable with this AFRC alliance if they were allowed to govern? (3) Would they ever agree to a compromise settlement now that they believe they would not be forcefully dislodged from the seat of power? The RUF would like to rule, without contesting elections, do not want to share power, immunity from prosecution, and financial security.
The Kabbatistas: Won the plurality at the elections. Has the moral and constitutional right to govern till the next elections. Perceived to be dominated by southerners and easterners, although Kabba himself appealed to a slightly wider consistuency during the elections. Has solid backing of the Karmajors. The Kabbatistas were perceived to have been trying to systematically disband the national army and prevent Kabba from implementing some of the RUF-favored items of the Peace Agreement. This grouping consists of two camps struggling to preserve the government-in-exile: Kabba and those of like-mind, who want to live up to the statesman image and be true to the principle of the Peace Agreement; and those that want to use the power of a seated government to completely neutralize the RUF, and now the AFRC,too.
Can Kabba manage to preserve his leadership of these internal factions, negotiate in good faith with the AFRC/RUF, and not lose the confidence of the militarist wing? Is this wing willing to compromise on anything to the RUF/AFRC for the resumption of a Kabba rule. Or are they willing to sacrifice a Kabba presidency, now that they have the momentum to wage war on the RUF/AFRC. If even Kabba successfully negotiate a compromise, would this wing abide by it and for how long?
Vidal
TO BE CONTINUED