Date: Thursday, 21-Nov-96 03:33 AM
From: Ibrahim Abdullah \ Internet: (idabdul@rs6000.cmp.ilstu.edu)
Subject: Bushpath to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the RUF/SL(Part Two)
Ghana and Libya: The External Connection
The expelled student union president was not the first to visit Libya. In 1983 Abdul Gbla made history as the first student union president to visit the LibyanArab Jama’riyya. Gbla’s visit was not clandestine; he was invited by the Libyansto participate in their revolutionary celeberation. He went in the company ofother students—Abdul Gabisi,Nurudeen Wilson—and two faculty members: CleoHanciles and Moses Dumbuya. Gbla got an executive treatment; he had a session with the Colonel and was specifically asked to stay after the celebrations. He however declined the offer because of fear of getting involved with the Libyans. The Libyans entered Salone in the mid-70s and began to make in-roads into civil society by using religion as well as non-religious forms to establish a presence. They provided generous grants to Haja Aisha Sasso for the annual pilgrimage to Makkah;linked up with the powerful and crafty business tycoon J.S. Muhamed who arranged a state visit for Stevens (Stevens could not stand the Colonel and turned down the invitation to go to the Benghazi military camps during his visit because he loath the tent culture); provided a printing press for the Tablet press through J.S.;and sponsored Green Book study groups at FBC. But their presence was not too visible; they maintained a low profile, and gradually worked their way into State House.Their alleged bankrolling of the OAU, however, remains unsubstantiated.
If ex-student leader was not the first student president to visit Libya, how did he establish the link that eventually led to the training of Sierra Leoneans in Benghazi in 1987 and 1988? It is quite possible, based on interviews with student radicals who knew Alie, that he had visited Libya before he became president in 1985. His occasional disappearing acts lend credence to such beliefs; he was known to carry the Guinean card d’indentite’ as a Guinean national.But why did
the expelled students, who were allegedly provided with a generous grant ($6000)by the UN to pursue their studies choose Ghana, not Nigeria or Liberia, the two other English speaking countries in the region? The choice of Ghana may not be unconnected with the strong Libyan presence which allowed for less policing of their "revolutionary" activites and therefore an ideal place. Besides,it is alleged that the Libyans did not know or even formally suppport their intention to continue their studies.Their understanding was that they were in exile to prosecute the "revolution".
When Alie Kabba and others were released from Pademba road his first port of call was Conakry,Guinea. From Conakry,they headed to Ghana. It is was the Peoples Bureau agent, as the Libyan embassies are known, who instructed him and his comrades to proceed to Ghana. They were admitted to Legon University and got money from the UN. This sponsorship was given to Alie and three other expelled students. As noted above,the choice of Ghana is significant.During this period the Libyans were busy trying to set up their African revolutionary army to pursue the Colonel’s dream of controlling the Azou trip in Chad. Ghana had a regime sympathetic to Libya’s anti-imperialist rhetoric; Rawlings "revolutionary" posture endered him to the Libyans. In the view of some members of the Ghanaian left , Rawlings succesfully used the Libyan card to bargain with the West. Libyan foriegn policy was crafted in the 80s in furtherance of a specifc goal: "revolution" in Africa. Everything about Libyan foreign policy in West Africa in the 80s was therefore revolved around this idea. Within this context it becomes easy to see why the Libyans went about recruiting West Africans to spread the "revolutionary" gospel. It was this need to expand in the region that interested them in Alie Kabba, and before him Charles Taylor(known as Charlie) and Kukoi Samba Sanyang(known as Dr. Manning) who now runs a pub on the outskirt of Ouagadougou.
The idea of having Sierra Leoneans as part of the "revolutionary" chain was not broached to Abdul Gbla, who refused to stay after the celebrations,to continue any discussion along such lines. The Libyan connection brought in some money—to further the revolution—as a result of which Alie and the other three students where able to sponsor four other expelled students who joined them in Ghana the following year, bringing the number to eight. During this period Alie frequented the Peoples Bureau, made numerous trips to Libya,and occasionally to Guinea. It
was during this period that he meet the NPFL leader Charles Taylor who had been imprisoned in the US,Ghana and Sierra Leone, and the legendary Kukoi Samba Sanyang who declared a dictatorship of the proletariat in The Gambia in 1980 and other so-called revolutionaries in the West African sub-region who criss-crossed Ghana-Burkina-Faso and Libya. Alie’s relationship with these types validated his alleged "revolutionary" credentials with the Libyans. This was important because the Libyans are notorious for dealing with a single individual. We do not know the nature of the relationship between the Libyans and the IRA. What we do know about Libyan connections with revolutionary organizations suggest that they always operate through a contact person. It is through this contact person that they channel funds and issue directives about "revoltuionary assignments" to be carried out.This was the type of the relationship they had with the several Chadian factions they supported in the 70s and 80s; with Museveni’s NRM; and Kwame Toure’s AAPRP.It was only after Museveni became head of state that they started doing business with Col. Otafiri.The onus of communicating with the organization therefore rests with the individual. In a situation where there is no organization, as was the case of Salone, such individual risk being enmeshed in what Africanists scholars now dubbed patrimonial politics. Such was the case with Alie who controlled resources; the Libyan man for the Salone "revolution".
What the Libyans did not understand, or rather did not want to understand, was the fact that Alie had no constituency outside the campus.Beacuse the Libyans themselves have never been involved in a revolutionary project, they were incapable of distinguishing between inflamatory student rhetoric and organizing a revolutionary movement.Alie could muster support from some cadres in the Koindu area, and did moblize some recruits for Charles Taylor and later for the Salone revolution from that area and Kono to go train in Libya, but he had no following, not even amongst his fellow students after their expulsion. The story that he/ they were "doing" revolutionary work in an anti-imperialist organization which he/they wanted the Libyans to sponsor was a cover to get the funds coming from the Colonel.This view is supported by those who went to Libya as well as those who were in Ghana with him. Inspite of this, the Libyans still channelled their activities in Sierra Leone through Alie. When he was given a "revolutionary assignment" to attack US targets in Freetown, Alie could not get the job done. When he tried to subcontract the job to PANAFU by promising monetary support; he was told to go away. It was a after his graduation in 1987, that the recruitment of Sierra Leoneans for training in Libya started. Alie coordinated the movement by staying in Ghana which was the transit point for all the recruits, from whence they flew to Tripoli. Yusuf’s question with which I started this posting is instructive.
The question then,is not exactly why the progressives/ radicals allowed Sankoh to take over the movement, the fundamental question,I would argue,is to locate theprogressives? What did they represent ? How radical where the radicals? What program did they have outside a voluntaristic intention to acquire military training? What was their political philosophy,if any? How did this translate into armed struggle? The so-called radicals had no organization, they were an infomral group linked together by their common experience. They did not have a common ideology nor did they have aprogram. The period from 1985 to 1987/88 when Sierra Leoneans went to Libya to train—six weeks basic weapon training—witnessed ashift in the composition of the radical groups in the city of Freetown and elsewhere. Student unionism was banned at FBC so that the centre of operation for the radicals became the city of Freetown, Bo,Kenema and to a lesser extent Koidu. This shift catapulted those radicals operating in revolutionary cells in the forefront of the movement for change. It was therefore to these groups, especially PANAFU, that the so-called radicals truned for recruits when they wereready to embark on the bushpath to destruction.
They were not the first to initiate a call to arms nor where they the first to emphasize the need for military training. In 1967 the APC had established training camps in Guinea under the command of the late Col. John Bangura. Ndorgborwosu survivors also expressed their conviction about the need for military training to resist/defend themselves against the APC.What this group appropriated was something that was already talked about; it had become part of the folklore of the revolution to be. The major difference is that this time around it would not be an "ex-military" officer (Col. Bangura had been discharged in the army by the SLPP regime) who would be in charge of the camps. By a curiousirony, it turned out to be a an ex-corporal in the signal unit, a man who had been jailed for an alleged coup attempt, who would spearhead this ancient call to arms to its logical conclusion: the overthrow of the "system".
The call came from Accra, Ghana in June/July 1987.Before then, the issue of recruitment had been debated in Accra, where Alie reportedly expressed his preference for the pote-types.This was severely criticized (but never rejected) on the grounds of political consciousness and the need to do more political work among the masses. Since they had not sufficiently done their home work among the masses, this option was considered dangerous. Back in Freetown, a special session of the PANAFU congress reluctantly tabled the isssue. The majority decided against an adventuristic enterprise in the name of revolution. This decision led to a split in the union: those who supported the move to go to Libya and those who were against. Those in favour were in the minority; they were eventually expelled from the movement. Among these were the late Abu Kanu(aka Commnader BK), a graduate of Njala University College and the late Rashid Mansaray, an activist from the east end, who had reportedly left the country in 1986 to join the MPLA in the fight against UNITA, only to be told to return home and pursue the struggle in his own country. Abu, Rashid and others left Freetown in July 1987 via Conakry and Accra, and from there to Tripoli. Another group, which included Foday Sankoh and others, left in August 1987.
Sankoh’s group included some recruits from Freetown and others from the provinces.Others came from Koindu and Kono in December 1987 as a result of Alie Kabba’s contacts. Another group consisting mostly of high school students from St. Edwards arrived in Tripoli in January 1988. The different dates in their arrival had something to do with money and the difficulties of convincing would-be recruits of the necessity to undertake military training. It was not the case that politically conscious individuals were specifcally targetted as recruits. Once PANAFU had rejected the idea of participating as an organization it became an individual enterprise; a voluntaristic endeavor of any man( no attempt was made to recruit women) who felt the urge to acquire insurgency training in the service of the "revolution."Alie Kabba who was in charge of disbursing funds never discussed the amount available nor did the Libyans listen to the incessant complaints from the Salone contingent about Alie’s handling of the situation. But the problem with Alie did not start in Libya,it started in Ghana even before the first recruits arrived.
Alie’s control of the purse, his clandestine and not so clandestine connections with peoples bureau officials in Accra, his links with Charles Taylor, and hisunbriddled ambition to Castro the "revolution" had begun to sow seeds of discord within the student group in Ghana as early as 1986. He was not the most committed nor was he the most ideologically advanced among this cohort. Alie’s central position---he is known to be an eloquent speaker .. was because of his link with the Libyans.It was his eloquence that earned him a seat on Abdul Gbla’s campaign panel during his elections in 1982/83 academic year.
When Alie reportedly told his comrades that he would not undertake military training for medical reasons, they were therefore suspicious.Others questioned his sincerity and commitment which on one occasion led to physical confrontation. According to his closest ally in Ghana,it was at this point that he began to play back what had transpired at FBC and painfully realised that Alie was " a fake revolutionary"; that Alie had nothing to loose if there was chaos and anarchy in Salone because all his relatives are Guineans resident in Guinea not Salone.For him, this was the begining of the end with Alie and his "revolutionary" pretensions.Perhaps, his position was one of misplaced nationalism. Yet it resonated with what others thought about Alie’s activities. If there is concensus about anything it is this:Alie was fake revolutionary. His alleged betrayal of the movement has become a central aspect of the "revolutionary" oral tradition.
And there was no program about what was to be done once the military training was over nor was there any debate about the program of action to be adopted.By this time Alie had reportedly assumed an entrepreneural role as a result of hisenviable position in the would be revolutionary movement. The *BASIC DOCUMENT OFTHE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE(RUF/SL):THE SECOND LIBERATION OF AFRICA* copiously quoted in the RUF propaganda booklet *FOOTPATHS TO DEOMOCRACRY: TOWARDS A NEW SIERRA LEONE, Vol One* was esentially a critique of the neo-colonial regime. This document, originally issued by PANAFU, was a call for a Popular Democratic Front(PDF). It was subsequently redrafted and edited to reflect the armed phase of the "revolution." Parts of it were butchered to appear as Foday Sankoh’s words. But the document had nothing to do with Sankoh or the RUF; it predated the formation of the RUF though it was later appropriated by Sankoh and his vanguard after they entered Kailahun in 1991.
It was produced in Ghana in 1987 with the technical assistance of a friend of Alie(she had a computer), an African-American woman, whom he had meet in Libya during one ofhis numerous "revolutionary" trips.
Perhaps, the tragedy of the "revolution" has to do with the fact that those whorecruited Sankoh underestimated his capacity to think and act politically.Sankoh was recruited by a PANAFU member who was active in the Liverpool Street area in the late 70s, and who later left for the provinces when the group broke up as a result of the departure of two of its members to Cuba in 1980. It was when Ebi, the leader of the group and an ecclectic and confuse "organic intellectual", settled in the diamond area and organized a cell that he discovered Sankoh.
Sankoh became associated with his group, attended meetings and started for the first time to acquaint himself with pan-Africanist/revolutionary literature.But Sankoh was not interested in reading, he was an action oriented individual who was reportedly impatient with the slow process of acquiring knowledge and understanding of the situation that a revolutionary project entails. Put in another way, Sankoh was a miliatarist. Before this period Sankoh’s world view did not go beyond the "Rockel river"; his ideas were strictly speaking that of an angry man who had an axe to grind because of his imprisonment. His critique of the system was still party and personality-centred. But he was a humble individual willing to listen and eager to learn.His age and his involvement with youths, some of whom could have been his children, earned him some respect and sympathy. Hence Pa Morlai.There is evidence that Sankoh did not abandon the possibility of seizing power through another military coup.His idea of revolution, if he had any before this period, was to seize power by any concieveable means. So when the call to troop to tripoli came from Accra, Sankoh willingly joined the crowd. What the others did not realise was that they were paving the way for Sankoh who had waited for just this kind of opportunity.
Alie’s intention to skip military training—cowardice and deceit some charged— on health grounds resurfaced in Libya. Majority of the recruits who heard about it were opposed to the decision. It was however impossible to put up any organised oppostion because the Sierra Leone contingent was divided, and scattered, in the various camps that littered Benghazi.It was only Alie who knew where all the groups were; he could locate people in their respective camps. The issue took a dramatic turn when Alie refused to grant Sankoh exemption from military training on health grounds.Even though Sankoh pleaded that he be excusedon the same grounds as Alie—he had problems from a previous surgery that would make the rigors of military training more of an ordeal—Alie refused to accepthis plea.As a military man, Sankoh knew what he was talking about.But he did not win the battle; he had to give in because he was in a postion of weakness. Alie on the other hand was able to skip training because he was in a position of strength.
When Alie, with the support of the Libyans, subsequently moved ahead to set up an High Command, supposedly to direct the Sierra Leone contingent, it was stoutly opposed by the majority of the recruits. The charge that Alie wanted to castro the revolution was echoed;others simply repeated what they had been told about Alie’s "democratic centralism"; while another group made it clear they are not interested in pursuing the project any more.In the ensuing confusion attempts to get Alie to account for money he supposedly got for the whole recruitment project proved impossible. According to some, Alie collected a fixed sum for (capitation fee?) every recruit who turned up in Libya; this view which was allegedly confirmed by Charles Taylor lend credence to the charge of "revolutionary" missappropriation. Perhaps, Charles Taylor was still bitter against Alie who was his recruiting agent in Koindu in 1987.There was even talk of eliminating those who decided that the project was not worth pursuing.In the end the motley collection of "revolutionaries" who went to Benghazi, about thirty, some say fifty, left Libya frustrated and divided. Some decided to forget about the experience; others decided to puruse the goal of "revolution".Tired,frustrated and isolated, Alie returned to Ghana in 1988,only to escape in 1989 when his his girl friend, Tigidankay, whom Alie was using to traffick drugs, was arrested and convicted. He sought refuge in Nigeria-not as a graduate student- with his African-American female friend, at the University of Nigeria, who later brought him to the US. The return trip from Libya ended a phase in the bushpath to destruction.
The Making of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone.
All those who went to Libya,and who later became involved in the RUF,including Sankoh, returned to Salone before the launching of the armed struggle.Back in Salone attempts were made to recruit and to start the training of cadres in theYele area. This was however abandoned because it was considered too risky.Up tothis point Sankoh had not emerged as the leader of the movement to be;there was no organization.Among those who returned to Salone and who were determined tocontinue the "revolution" were Sankoh, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray. They formeda closed group in the city and embarked upon another recruitment drive. This time, it was decided that they should leave Freetown and settle in the provinces. It was this move to the provinces which opened the link between the RUF to be andthe NPFL. From the time they left Benghazi in 1988 to the period when they entered Salone as armed combatants, this trio travelled extensively in the country and in Liberia. It was during one of these trips that they came into contact with NPFL officials who were recruiting in the Kiondu area and Monrovia. The existing accounts are somewhat conflicting.
According to one source, Sankoh met Charles Tyalor in Libya in 1987, who theninvited him to join the NPFL. This account does appear credible because the NPFL was orginally constituted as a pan- African movement with membership open to Liberians as well as non-Liberians. The confused Kukoi Samba was initially a member of the NPFL and vice-president. What remains uncertain is that the meeting took place at all. For Charles Taylor had parted company with the Libyans around July 1987, this was even before Sankoh and others went to Libya. Charles Taylordid meet other Sierra Leoneans in Libya in 1986 and early 87; he knew Alie verywell. If the meeting did take place in Libya why did Sankoh fail to take up theoffer at a time when he needed it? This would have been an opportunity for Sankoh to establish his independence at a time when it was apparent that the Libyans were backing Alie and were not going to provide the arms and ammunition needed to launch the struggle. If Sankoh had meet Taylor he would definately have turned up at Po, in Burkina Faso, where the majority of the NPFL fighters were trained.
As far as we know, no Sierra Leoneans were trained in Burkina Faso. The masterstrategist would hardly have missed such an opportunity. The other account, that they came into contact with an NPFL official in late 1988, seems to confirm what subsequently happened. By mid 1989 a deal between the two groups had been sealed: Sankoh and his groupwould help Taylor "liberate" Liberia, after which he would provide them with abase to launch their struggle in Sierra Leone. It was after this informal alliance that the BASIC DOCUMENT was amended to reflect the change.The insistence that it was/is RUF/SL seem to follow a pattern: Wallace-Johnson’s West African Youth League was always the Sierra Leone branch/chapter. Whether this was done at the instigation of Taylor or whether it was borrowed from the Wallace-Johnson’s youth league is not clear. But it is no doubt an aspect of the pan-Africanist image which the organization sought to promote. And we do not know if any Sierra Leonean took part in the initial NPFL attack on Mimba county in December 1989.
What is known is that Sankoh and others were in Freetown up to the eve of the initial attack in Kailahun in 1991 trying to convince those who had gone to train in Libya to join the movement. It was during this crucial trip, that they reportedly bought all the map of Salone available in the Govt. bookshop and eslewhere in the city. Their movement alarmed some PANAFU members who threatened to report their presence and activities to the police. By August 1990, some members of this vanguard group, including Sankoh, Rashid and Abu, had seen action as NPFL combatants.
But there was no election, nor was there a central committee. The movement was headed by a collective leadership of five. This included Sankoh, Rashid, Abu and two others. It was generally agreed that Sankoh would be the spokesperson for the group. When on 23 March 1991 the Revolutionary United Front entered Bomaru in Kailahun district it was Sankoh who annonced to the world what the RUF was all about. The insurgency force was composed of the original group, those who had acquired military training in Libya, and a second group Sierra Leoneans who were resident in Liberia, mostly lumpens, in the waterside area; a third group of hard core veterans of the Liberian war, were also involved,on loan to the RUF. Contrary to Paul Richards’ account, the Sierra Leoneans in Liberia were not "political exiles and economic refugees" (p4), they had settled in Liberia and were recruited in the same way other lumpens were recruited in Sierra Leone. This is confimed by several lumpen Sierra Leonean who were in Liberia and who were asked to join the movement. This social composition of the movement is significant in our understanding of the war and the wanton violence and destruction which this bushpath to destruction has wrought.
The Character of the Revolutionary United Front
How revolutionary is a "revolutionary" movement which slaughters the very people which it claims to be liberating? What yardstick do we use to understand a movement which claims to be a revolutionary without revolutionaries? What text(s), what action(s) do we deploy to understand this movement that has wrought untold damage to the countryside that it rightly claims has been neglected by the city-based politicians? To understand the character of the RUF, we need to lookat the social composition of the ruffians, those who constitute the movement, their policies and their actions. We need to look at the contradictions of their pronouncements;the silences, and of course the (mis)representations, about themselves and their program. To quote Sankoh "Yes, we have committed atrocities.One day we shall stand before the people and ask for forgiveness."(Amnesty International--*Sierra Leone:Towards a Future Founded on Human Rights*, p.25).In what name were those atrocities committed?
The RUF is a peculiar type; it does not share any of the characteristics of the so-called second independence movements in Africa nor does it share any of the discipline—ideology and organization—which marks revolutionary movements in Africa or elswhere in the world, outside the use of violence to attain power. It shares a lot with RENAMO which was formed as a counter-revolutionary force to sabotage the Mozambiquan revolution and whose bandido activities did not cease even when Dlakama and his leadership invented themselves as liberation fightersmand pseudo-revolutionaries. Monkey nor dey lef im black an. The RUF, on the other hand, started as a "revolutionary" movement. What connects the two is the wanton violence on women, on children and the destruction of the economy. Richards attempt to compare the movement to the Shining path misses the point. The Shining Path was formed by intellectuals who were convinced that they had something to learn from the campesinos (peasants) a la Mao; we do not have these types in the RUF nor has the RUF established any meaningful relationship with the peasantry based on trust and an acceptance of a common program produced within the context of revolutionary dialogue. The use of young combatants is feature of present day warfare and therefore not an important variable with which to judge the two movements. It is interesting to note that the only movement with revolutionary pretensions that share anything with the RUF happens to be the NPFL. This is not coincidental: they are products of the same cultural milieu; their followership are recruited from the same source-lumpens- and they employ the same tactics to further their goal of capturing state power. An interesting angle to ponder is:
why did two of the most conservative countries in Africa, settled by freed slaves from the so-called new world, produced such horrendous carricature of what a liberation project is supposed to be? The torture and eventual murder of Sergeant Doe by the former NPFL commander Yormie Johnson and the mutilation, murder and rape of innocent women and children by the RUF, are not acts that haave given revolution a different meaning. I would argue, that these "revolutionary excesses" were committed again and again precisely because of thesocial compostion of these movements. A lumpen movement breeds a lumpen revolution.
The RUF’s Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone contains words and phrases lifted from Mao and Amilcar Cabral. Drafted in London and tossed back to the Zogoda for approval, it was subsequently reformatted complete with the RUF anthem and generous quotations from Sankoh.The most important question remains:why echo Mao and Cabral and not pratice what they preached? "We moved deeper into the comforting bossom of our mother earth- the forest".."The forest welcomed us and gave us succour and sustenance .."Why we continue to fight " are taken from Mao and Cabral. If they had indeed read Mao they would have related to the peasantry differently; if they the had read Cabral they would not have recruited lumpens; they would have taken the "weapon of theory" very seriously. For Cabral had cautioned, based on the PAIGC experience in Guinea, against recruiting lumpen elements in revolutionary movements.It is tempting to attribute this to Fanon who is quoted in the first page of Foothpaths. But this would be reading too much becuase the original PANAFU document did come with that quotation. There is, I would argue, no revolutionary theory which guides the practice of the movement.If there is any theory at all it evolved on an ad hoc basis as a result of their experiences in the forest. It is in this light that Paul Richards attempt to make connections with the Green book remains speculative.